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T
he cover story of this
issue of Region Focus
seeks to frame the
policy debate about the future
of the credit rating agencies. It’s
certainly a timely discussion.
When financial institutions
began to post significant losses,
some observers suggested that
many financial institutions had
invested in new, complex secu-
rities — some of which have
been downgraded to junk status
today — mainly because those assets were at that time
given a seal of approval by one of the “Big Three” rating
agencies. Some of the reform proposals being discussed in
Washington are geared toward eliminating what many
argue were conflicts of interest that arose in the course of
awarding those ratings. 
It’s important to acknowledge the concerns that many
have about the agencies and how those agencies might have
influenced the quality of investor information. After all,
clear and reliable information is an important component of
a properly functioning market. If an investor doesn’t under-
stand how a securitized asset is constructed — maybe
because it is too opaque or simply too confusing to under-
stand — market discipline may be weakened. Either a lack
of transparency or a lack of comprehension by the buyer of
an asset can lead to little or no check on the originators and
underwriters of those securities.
Yet it may not be entirely appropriate to blame the
apparent shortcomings of the securitization markets simply
on the complexity of the products. If indeed that com-
plexity raised sufficient concern among investors, it should
have been reflected in the prices of those assets. And if
those risk premia were not as high as we think they should
have been after the fact, an undeserved credit rating may
not have been the only contributing factor. It could be that
investors simply had an incorrect view of the future of the
economy or of particular institutions.
Nor is it appropriate to place all the blame with the credit
rating agencies. Yes, an investor’s false sense of security 
may have been reinforced by the inflated grade given to 
a securitized asset by the rating agencies. But intelligent
institutional investors also probably had some understand-
ing that the ratings awarded by the Big Three agencies were
flawed in certain respects. That could have just as easily
been factored into the price too. And indeed it was, to 
some extent, as structured securities routinely traded at
spreads greater than similarly rated, but less complex, 
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corporate bonds. This leads one to question the extent to
which investors had a competing incentive to ignore coun-
tervailing information about the potential riskiness of the
securitized assets they were buying. 
One plausible reason investors bought these securities
involves the incentives built into the capital requirements
that financial institutions must observe. Credit ratings
issued by the agencies were used to assign “risk weights” to
the securities banks held. If the grade was high, banks could
hold less capital as a buffer against losses. That gave banks
an incentive to hold the highest-yielding (that is, riskiest)
securities with any given rating — in short, potentially over-
rated securities.
Such a strategy might seem especially desirable to certain
financial institutions if market participants believed the
federal government would treat those institutions as “too
big to fail” and would take action to keep them alive in the
face of impending insolvency. This implicit promise to bail
out institutions considered important to the stability of
capital markets could have dampened market discipline no
matter how good the information produced by rating agen-
cies and others might have been. 
When the government is in the business of protecting a
certain class of investors and institutions against downside
risk, it should be no surprise that those investors and insti-
tutions are more likely to take on risk. It should also be no
surprise that information which might have spurred caution
might be given less attention in such cases.
Better information — whether through a reformed 
rating process or through increased disclosure — could 
contribute to better functioning markets. But better infor-
mation alone will not be sufficient to bring effective market
discipline to bear on institutions that are widely viewed as
too big to fail. What will be necessary is a widespread belief
among investors that the government will not necessarily
protect large institutions which make imprudent invest-
ments. So far, investors have little reason to believe that 
is the case. Indeed, quite the opposite. Establishing tighter
boundaries on the financial safety net — and making those
boundaries well known and credible — is a key task facing
policymakers.
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